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A Review of Yeats, Philosophy, and the Occult
Matthew Gibson and Neil Mann, eds. Yeats, Philosophy, and the Occult (Columbia:
Clemson University Press, 2016), pp. xix+344, ISBN 9781942954255.

Reviewed by Gregory Castle

A

mid the steady outpouring of scholarly titles on W. B. Yeats over the last
quarter century or so, one discerns an equally steady advance in our
understanding of the poet’s occult and philosophical interests. George
Mills Harper and Mary Jane Harper brought out four volumes of Yeats’s Vision Papers and their daughter, Margaret Mills Harper, published new editions
of AVA and AVB in collaboration with Catherine Paul. In 2012, Neil Mann,
Matthew Gibson, and Clair Nally published an edited volume, W. B. Yeats’s “A
Vision”: Explications and Contexts, which furthered this general trend toward
making A Vision legible to a new generation of readers. Four years later, Gibson and Mann compiled another collection, Yeats, Philosophy, and the Occult,
which aims to place Yeats’s philosophical and occult writings in the context of
other contemporary intellectual traditions. It is a comparative study with some
fascinating points of entry: Yeats’s unpublished drafts; his potential borrowing
from Cesare Lombroso and Oswald Spengler; his extensive immersion in the
history of dreams; his study of Indian sacred books as well as Pierre Duhem’s
theories of the Great Year; and his interest in philosophers like Bishop Berkeley and Alfred North Whitehead. After a brisk introduction by the volume’s
editors, which establishes the need for the volume, Wayne Chapman walks
us through some of the major works on Yeats that are important for understanding his philosophical and occult writing. In keeping with Chapman’s own
archival interests, he spends some time exploring an unpublished dialogue,
“Anglo-Ireland. | a conversation,” which he calls a “dress rehearsal” for “The
Phases of the Moon” (33). He shows, through meticulous analysis of textual
emendations, that it is “a good start, but a false one” (43), whose chief value is
to index Yeats’s changing ideas about the system underlying the poem. Chapman also argues that the dialogue is an adaptation of Walter Savage Landor’s
Imaginary Conversations, which Yeats annotated (the editors reproduce these
annotations, though not Landor’s text, in Appendix I). Chapman’s point about
“conversation” playing a role in the development of the poem illustrates a practice evident throughout this volume: mining the archives to fill in the gaps in
our knowledge about Yeats’s occult system.
The remaining six chapters take us through some familiar and some not-sofamiliar ground. Charles Armstrong considers Yeats’s “Eastern introductions
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of the 1930s”—prominently including one to Shri Purohit Swami’s An Indian
Monk—which he argues are “so closely linked” to A Vision that “they might
be read as mirroring texts” (90). Perhaps as important as any corollaries that
may exist between Yeats’s system and Indian thought are the “reclusiveness of
the ascetic ideal” and the dialectical “union of Self and Not-self ” (96) that he
found in the work of Swami and other Indian writers. This chapter flows easily
into Mann’s discussion of dreams, which, for Yeats, provided “access to unseen
aspects of reality” (109). Mann focuses on an important early notebook, called
PIAL after Maud Gonne’s Golden Dawn motto, that Yeats kept from 1908–17
(155, n5). At the heart of his argument is Yeats’s enigmatic epigraph to Responsibilities: “In dreams begins responsibility.” Mann claims that “dreams placed
responsibility on the dreamer to attempt to understand what they offered—
advice, a warning, an explanation, or exploration of a theme. They were to be
‘questioned’…” (114). Mid-career works like Per Amica Silentia Luna (1917)
and the first edition of A Vision (1925) engage in a form of Hermetic questioning guided by the Golden Dawn belief that “truth cannot be discovered but
may be revealed” (127). Revelation comes through the agency of the image,
which links vision and dream, for in both, “imagination has some way of lighting on the truth that the reason has not” (Yeats, CW4 51; quoted 128). These
investigations, as well as the lectures on ghosts and the Automatic Script, blur
the lines between dreamer and dream, the living and the dead. Indeed, the
dead figure prominently, for “Yeats almost takes it for granted that the dead will
use the minds of the living in sleep and waking to achieve the recapitulations
and amends they need” (145–46). The dead remain, for poet and mystic alike,
“a community of spirits” (154).
In Yeats’s schema, dreams are symptoms of a larger temporal system, one in
which a “community of spirits” can interact across historical epochs. Graham
Dampier’s chapter on the Four Faculties (Creative Mind, Will, Spirit, and Husk)
across the historical cones deepens our understanding of Yeats’s Great Wheel
and his historical vision generally by linking it to Spengler’s The Decline of the
West (1918–23). Dampier argues that critics have missed a connection between
the two: the close match between Spengler’s “morphology of history”—the idea
that “every moment in history corresponds to a point in the development of a
past civilization, society, or culture”—and Yeats’s theory of “‘four interacting
periods’ of history” (231) that correspond to positions of the Four Faculties
on the historical cones. This interaction produces cyclical movements of religious (primary) and secular (antithetical) civilizations that “always intersect
and so come to signify the strife that conditions human development” (243).
The “conceptually similar” approaches taken by both writers extends only to
a point, however, for “[u]nlike Spengler, Yeats does not claim to have found
the solutions to the problems of history” (233). Dampier raises the pertinent
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question: “If the past has such a formative influence on the present, can there
be any place left for novelty, progress, and change?” (247). The answer is yes, for
A Vision “shows that every point of human progress is influenced by three past
moments of time that inform the present, but without determining it” (249).
If Spengler offered Yeats confirmation of his system at the level of history, in Katherine Ebury’s account Cesar Lombroso offers something more
localized: confirmation of Yeats’s understanding of the relation, in A Vision,
between genius and certain “types” in the Phases of the Moon. There is little
doubt that Yeats owned Lombroso’s After Death—What? (1909) and that he
reveled in crime fiction. More important, there are suggestive parallels between
the phases and Lombroso’s thought on the “moral implications” of “beauty and
ugliness” (69), which leads to a provocative discussion of his “theorizations of
the criminal body” and Yeats’s figure of the Hunchback (72–73). At times, the
grounds for a connection appear rather thin, as when Lombroso’s thoughts on
creative genius are said to “coincide” with Yeats’s on the basis of a short-list
of geniuses from Balzac to Whitman that “both discuss in detail, or who are
otherwise important to their system of thought”; or when Ebury notes that
Lombroso’s “direct influence on Yeats’s typology seems clear” (73; my emphasis). However, she is on solid ground when she turns to Purgatory and the On
the Boiler; the convergence of “criminality, eugenics, and spiritualism in Lombroso’s work” (75) seems especially germane to Yeats’s late Gothic play of crime
and destiny and his dyspeptic tract on Ireland’s national health.
Gibson’s contribution on the concept of the Great Year and Duhem’s
Système du monde, like Colin McDowell’s essay on Bishop Berkeley, revisit
familiar themes in Yeats’s occult writings and philosophical research. Gibson
exhaustively explains the workings of the Great Wheel and the historical cones
before offering an equally comprehensive account of Yeats’s evolving understanding of the Great Year—that is, the cycle of equinoxes around the solar
ecliptic that Yeats believed lasted for 36,000 ordinary solar years (today’s estimate is 25,800). His goal was “to integrate the cycle of the individual soul into
the changes and fluctuations of a world soul informing history itself ” (172). He
dallied with concepts like the “Kalpa,” which is “1,000 Maha Yugas” (one Maha
Yuga is “12,000 divine years”), which adds up to “4,320,000,000 human years”
(190–91). Though he settled on a more scientific measurement of the Great
Year, he never lost sight of the mystical power it held. Duhem’s importance
lay primarily in “conditioning Yeats’s improved understanding of the concept”
(208), particularly his adoption of a 36,000-year limit structured around the
Platonic “perfect number” thirty-six (and its multiples) (211–12). According
to Gibson, Yeats also found in Duhem’s theory of the Great Year an alternative
to Nietzsche’s “eternal return.”
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If Gibson drills down into the temporal concepts that govern A Vision,
McDowell ranges widely across Yeats’s works, considering his attitudes toward abstraction and particularity, focusing on Berkeley but making forays
into other thinkers. As he and other contributors to this volume show, Yeats
was zealous in his pursuit of ideas from any tradition that coincided with and
helped clarify his own occult system. Philosophy was part of that system, rather
than the other way around, as Yeats’s reading of Berkeley (and, for that matter,
Duhem) indicate. With Berkeley we return to the dream, and specifically to
Yeats’s notion that the philosopher had “proved all things a dream” (“Blood
and the Moon,” quoted 254). McDowell distinguishes between the “‘old’ view…
that Berkeley is a ‘subjective idealist’”—a view exemplified by Yeats’s line—and
a new one that sees the philosopher as a “common-sense realist” (256). Yeats’s
admiration for Berkeley is due in large measure to the latter’s reconciliation of
the abstract and particular, which he expresses laconically in the Commonplace
Book: “all abstract ideas whatsoever are particular” (261). As McDowell points
out at the end of his essay, Berkeley shared with Zen Buddhism a belief in the
limit imposed by experience, a belief that Yeats described in a letter to Sturge
Moore: “Nothing can exist that is not in the mind as ‘an element of experience’”
(273). Yeats seizes upon Berkeley because he sees in his work, especially in the
Commonplace Book, the anti-mechanistic, anti-positivist, ideas that he favored
(264). McDowell reminds us that Yeats’s spiritualist and occult writings were
informed by a close understanding of those philosophers whose thought overlapped with his own.
This volume offers no conclusion, but McDowell’s reflections on the abstraction and the particular and on the value of experience in determining
what exists resonate throughout Yeats, Philosophy, and the Occult and speak
also to our own era, in which new forms of abstraction threaten our purchase
on day-to-day life and our dreams for the future. The essays compiled by Gibson and Mann remind us that Yeats’s solution to the questions of our existence,
our time in this “foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart” (VP 629–30), is to take
responsibility for dreams and to welcome all of time into a redemptive poetic
vision.

